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Abstract 
The public, donor community and the political subjects in Macedonia are 
occupied with the issues of decentralization. The bills package on territorial 
division, financing LSG and the status of the capital Skopje have passed the 
government/parliament procedure. In this paper some recent developments 
and challenges on the newly enacted law on financing LSG will be presented. 
We will use the main pillars of fiscal decentralization approach. Also, an 
attempt is made to estimate the fiscal capacity of LSG by using three 
techniques: the own revenue collection, GDP per LSG and the representative 
tax system with regression analyses. The deficiency here is the availability of 
data. Namely the revenue data are available for the NUTS 4 level that is the 
34 LSG from the before 1996 territorial organization. Estimation is conducted 
for the unconditional horizontal equalization formula in accordance with the 
new law on financing LSG. In the end some administrative implication from 
the law are illustrated and some comments on the statistical information 
system in the country related to the LSG are illustrated. 
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Theoretical comments on fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization is assigning fiscal decision-making powers and management 
responsibilities to lower levels of government in a devolved government system (Boex 
[2001]). Devolution is a process of shifting responsibilities for government functions and 
expenditures from the central to the local governments in which the local governments 
are granted substantive decision-making authority. The main pillars of fiscal 
decentralization are: 
1. Expenditure responsibilities (clear definition of what will be the responsibilities of 
the LSG) 
2. Revenue assignment (each revenue stream must follow a function responsibility) 
3. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers (ensure vertical and horizontal fiscal balance) 
4. Subnational borrowing (require well suited regulation, strong financial institutions 
and good management of macroeconomic environment) 
The expenditure responsibilities are what should we first start with when the 
decentralization is on the agenda. The experience of many economies in transition shows 
that without a specific expenditure assignment, it is revenue availability that dictates the 
responsibility of each government level and this situation leads to institutional instability 
and again to an inefficient provision of public services (Martinez-Vazquez [1998]). This 
stage will define and separate the functions and the responsibilities of each level of 
government. Interesting enough, even though this is the most important part of the fiscal 
decentralization, the public debate was much more on the revenue assignments that 
should match the responsibilities of the LSG in Macedonia. The stage of revenue 
assignments must give answer to the questions how much revenues must be devoted to 
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the assigned responsibilities, what will be fiscal source and what mechanism will assure 
those revenues stream. In addition to the assigning revenue sources, the central 
government may precede with additional revenues transfer to LSG through fiscal 
transfers or grants. Once the expenditure/revenue scheme is put on place the central 
government may decide on the possibility of LSG to finance their fiscal deficit with 
borrowing and/or issuing debt.  
Fiscal decentralization is a pure economic problem and politics should be put aside. It 
is a simple principle of efficiency in providing certain service to the consumer with the 
lowest efficient level of government organization (the “subsidiarity” principle). Classical 
example is that the basic school service is more efficient to be provided by the 
municipality because the citizens of that municipality will send their children to study 
near the place they live and they best know how to organize it in terms of capacity, 
transportation, auxiliary services, school management decision making etc. It is not 
efficient for the central government to organize it because they do not know the day-to-
day needs of the citizens, they do not take into account (or it is to costly) the difference in 
culture and education needs at local level. It is the monitoring and information gathering 
cost for the central government that prevents it to be more efficient than the local 
government in this example. On the other side the central government may provide a 
broad legal framework in order to set up a general standards. Now, take into account the 
classical example of military services. The protection of the state is more efficiently 
provided by the central government because of more efficient use of information to 
organize an army, less costly coordination, it is a public good and a general need for the 
whole state.   
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Some implementation rules for fiscal decentralization (Bahl [1999]) are that the 
finance should always follow function, there must be a strong ability to monitor and 
evaluate decentralization, one intergovernmental system doesn’t fit the urban and the 
rural sector, the design of the intergovernmental transfer system should match the 
objectives of the decentralization reform, recognition that intergovernmental systems are 
always in transition and that must be taken into account and planned. In Macedonia a 
threat to the decentralization process is the modest public debate about all of these rules.  
Basic facts about Macedonian LSG organization 
Macedonian administration system is a two-tier system with central government 
and 123 LSG-municipalities. The average model Macedonian municipality versus 
diversity is presented in the next table:  
By the law on 
territorial 
division from 
1996  
Lowest Average Highest 
Inhabitants 456 15821 118079 
Area (in km2) 6 201 606 
Local roads 
(km) 
2 31 159 
 
What is the optimal size of LSG? The philosopher Plato says that the ideal city 
should have a size sufficient to deliver all-important functions but be small enough to 
protect the unity of the city. Thus, even the great philosopher is admitting the dichotomy 
 5
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
Skopje, Macedonia 
http//: www.cea.org.mk  
 
and the trade off of this optimization problem. Of course that other factors should be 
taken into account like economic efficiency, urban/rural, developed/undeveloped, 
agriculture/industrial, near border municipalities, cultural, ethnical and other economic, 
social and political considerations. For illustrational purposes the average model 
municipalities in selected countries is presented in the next table (source Swianiewicz 
[2002]): 
 
% 
Municipalities 
below 1000 
inhabitants 
Average 
population 
Average area 
(km2) 
Serbia and 
Monte Negro 
0 49500 487 
Bulgaria  0 35000 432 
Poland 0 16000 130 
Macedonia  
(Law-1996; 
census 2002) 
4 16443 209 
Slovenia 3 10300 106 
Hungary 54 3300 32 
Czech Republic  80 1700 13 
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Can we say by the results from the table above that Macedonia is fragmented 
country? We can see it is in between the extremes of Bulgaria on one side and Czech 
Republic on the other side. 
Here we will present analysis of the economies of scale of the administrative costs 
in the context of the LSG size in Macedonia. 
 The administrative costs composite index is calculated from three variables: 
1. Number of employees in the LSG administration per capita; 
2.  Salaries over total expenditures at the LSG; 
3. Total municipality budget expenditure in the LSG per capita. 
This index will help in this microeconomic efficiency analysis. The inputs are the 
employees and their salaries in the municipalities’ administration and the municipality 
administration budget. The output measure is the number of citizens served in the 
relevant municipality.  
The administrative cost composite index for each of the 123 LSG in Macedonia is 
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0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
31
6
98
4
1,3
22
1,5
53
2,1
74
2,4
78
2,8
58
3,2
49
3,5
36
3,7
60
4,1
44
4,5
36
5,0
71
6,0
07
7,2
27
8,1
10
8,5
86
9,4
67
10
,44
1
11
,89
0
12
,31
0
14
,44
2
16
,81
3
17
,50
5
19
,21
2
24
,25
3
30
,13
8
41
,49
0
54
,38
0
70
,84
1
86
,40
8
 7
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
Skopje, Macedonia 
http//: www.cea.org.mk  
 
illustrated in the next figure. 
From the figure we can see that by increasing the number of inhabitants in the 
LSG in Macedonia the administrative cost composite index is diminishing. The black line 
is a quadrate regression of the population behavior and the red line is the average 
composite index for Macedonia.  
What the figure illustrates is the increasing economies of scale of up to 6000 
inhabitants in the Macedonian municipalities (by doubling the inputs we get more than 
double citizens served). The increasing economies of scale are diminishing significantly 
from 316 up to 6000 inhabitants and latter we can say that there are constant economies 
of scale in serving citizens depending on the size of municipality. In Macedonia with the 
census 2002 and territorial division from 1996 there are 52 municipalities with less then 
6,000 inhabitants with some 150,000 total population.  
From the figure one can see that the optimal minimal size of LSG in Macedonia is 
around 6000 inhabitants if the criteria is the cost for municipality administration in 
rendering administrative services. This is close to the threshold of 5000 in the Slovenian 
territorial model and the 6000 in the Bulgarian model. 
Expenditure assignments 
In this section first part is devoted to the envisaged expenditure responsibility 
assignment as from the new law on financing LSG and the second part some quantitative 
analysis will be conducted.  
Assignment of the new expenditure responsibilities 
Interesting enough for the case of Macedonia is that first the bill on financing the 
LSG was set for government procedure and than the law on territorial division. Usually it 
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is more logical first to know how many municipalities there will be so that certain 
simulations and analyses regarding the financing can be done. Nevertheless, the 
assignment of expenditures will be based on gradual shifting of responsibilities to 
municipalities through a phased approach.  
The monitoring of the overall development of the financing system will be a 
responsibility of a commission set up by the government (article 15 from the law).  
The commission will be responsible in front of the government for: 
1. Monitoring implementation of the criteria for the central government transfers,  
2. Will give recommendations for improving the system and overcome the 
deviations identified,  
3. Will take care about the transparency, 
4. Gives opinion about the formula for transferring the unconditional grant from the 
VAT and about the methodology for distribution of block grants.  
The commission have representatives from: Ministry of LSG, finance, science and 
education and labor and social policy each assigning one representative and five 
representatives from ZELS. However, this commission will have no decision making 
power. For each phase of the decentralization process there will be separate commissions 
that will appraise if the conditions are met for the respectful phase (article 45 and 46).   
Thus, one should differentiate among three commissions: 
1. Commission for the overall monitoring of the system 
2. Commission responsible for the first phase conditions 
3. Commission responsible for the second phase conditions 
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The two step phased approach of assigning responsibility is illustrated in the next 
table:
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Phase  Starting
date 
Assignment of responsibility Conditional on 
1. Phase 
January 1st 
2005 
1. Transferring own revenues from tax sources 
(the PIT sharing) to municipalities (GOV) 
2. Developing a methodology for transferring 
the capital and earmarked (GOV) 
3. The LSG will start with the plan 
implementation of solving the liabilities and 
arrears up to 31st of January 2001  (LSG) 
If 90 % of the total municipalities comprising 90 
% of the total population will provide: 
1. At least 2 financial officers 
2. At least 3 tax experts 
2. Phase Conditional  
Assignment of the responsibilities (for the block 
transfers): 
1. Culture 
2. Social welfare and child protection 
(kindergartens and homes for elderly) 
3. Education (primary and secondary school) 
1. All the conditions from phase 1 are satisfied 
2. A proper capacity of the financial officers 
(this is already stated in the previous phase) 
3. Viable results of 24 months for on time and 
regular reporting confirmed by the ministry 
of finance 
 11
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
Skopje, Macedonia 
http//: www.cea.org.mk  
 
4. Healthcare (public health organizations and 
primary care)  
4.  There are no accounts payable than usual 
ones (what usual ones means?) 
5. The phase commission will evaluate if all the 
conditions are satisfied 
6. There is a written request from the 
municipalities to the proper ministry and the 
ministry of finance for block transfers after 
all the conditions are satisfied.  
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The municipalities have full responsibility for those assignments in terms of 
current (wages, maintenance etc) expenditures, capital (investment) expenditures, 
management issues, hiring and firing teachers, school management organization and 
management as regulated in separate laws for the appropriate areas.  
Quantitative analysis of the expenditure responsibilities 
The vertical fiscal balance illustrated as expenditures by different levels of 
government is illustrated in the next table (as % of 2003 GDP):  
General Government         34.19 % 
Central Government          21.27% 
Extra-budgetary funds       19.8 % 
Local Governments             1.7 % (only 0.9 % in 2001) 
 
The only 1.7 % of GDP expenditures from the LSG in Macedonia compared with 
the 21.27 % of GDP expenditures from the central government lists Macedonia in one of 
the most centralized countries in the world. The new proposed law will change the 
situation as presented in the next table:  
Local Governments      sharing type tax (3 % from PIT, 100 % artisans PIT)                                           
equalizing transfer (3 % VAT)                                                                            2.1 % 
 
Block grants included (9 billion education, 30 million health, 1 billion social protection 
and 500 million culture)                                                                                       6.1 % 
 
Block grants as % of 2003 GDP are: 
 LSG transfer in MKD Central budget 2003 in MKD 
Education 3.4 % (around 9 billion) 3 % (around 9 billion) 
Health 0.01 % (around 30 million) 0.1 % (around 350 million) 
Social protection 0.4 % (around 1 billion) 6 % (around 17 billion) 
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Culture 0.2 % (around 500 million) 0.6 % (around 1.5 billion) 
 
Comparative data for some selected countries are presented in the next table 
(Levitas [2003]; Oplotnik and Brezovnik [2003]; Ivanov [2003]). 
Country  Share of local expenditures in GDP Year 
Serbia and Monte Negro 5.6 2003 
Bulgaria  7.33 2002 
Poland 12 1999 
Macedonia (Law 1996) 0.9 2001 
Macedonia (Law 1996) 1.7 2003 
Macedonia (Law 2003) 6.1 20033
Slovenia 5.31 2001 
Hungary 11.1 1999 
Czech Republic  8.6 1999 
 
The actual LSG expenditures for 2002 in Macedonia are: 
 Lowest Average Highest 
    
Current (as % of total) 22 84 100 
     Wage bill (as % of current) 7 45 100 
Investment (as % of total) 0 16 78 
    
                                                 
3 CEA estimate.  
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In per capita term    
Current (in $ US) 3 12 102 
Wage bill (in $ US) 1 5 27 
Investment (in $ US) 0 3 38 
 
The variability among municipalities related to the expenditure responsibilities are 
presented in the next figure.  
88
9
5 1 4 0
17
0
10
20
30
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50
60
70
80
90
<40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-90% 91-110% 111-120% >120%
Biased variability towards higher expenditures in 
big urban centers 2002 data and 123 LSGs
 
From the figure above we can see that 72 % (88 municipalities) are realizing less 
than 40 % of the average expenditures from the total. This is unacceptable diversity of 
unbalanced development and an argument to maybe induce a discussion of as two tier 
system by introducing a regions just for purpose of more balanced development. The high 
LSG disparity was confirmed also with other studies (for example see Nikolov, Stojkov, 
Bogov 2004). 
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The revenue assignment 
 
Before the new law on financing the following sources of financing and their 
amount for 2001 
were available 
to the LSG4.  
S
 
 
 847,617,410
595,831,269
22,000,000
571,376,343
179,488,667
27,734,439
24,496,121
10,425,717
16,000,000
1,447,352,556
0 
258,718,000
258,718,000
0 
0 
TOTAL: 2,553,687,966
ource Actual 2001
         SOURCES OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 2001 in MKD                         
Revenues from taxes:
Property tax
Tax on specific services
Fees on utilization and licenses for carrying out activities
TOTAL:
Special purposes Grants from the State Budget
Non-Tax revenues:
Enterprenuership profit and profit from property
Administrative tax and allowances
Other non-tax revenues
From the Road Fund
From the Water Found 
Agency for the Underdeveloped regions
Program for water supply 
Program for physical and detailed urban plans
Program for village revitalization
Program for electrification
Program for mass media in cities
TOTAL:
Block Grants
TOTAL:
General fiscal assistance
From " surplus revenues"
TOTAL:
Reimbursements for costs of delegated functions
Reimbursements for costs incurred for local elections
TOTAL:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can note a high fiscal dependency of LSG on the central government in 2001 
(67 % of municipal revenues derived directly from the national government; the 
comparable “dependency ratio” for local governments in the average EU country is 45 
%). 
                                                 
4 It is worth to note that the 2003 municipal sources of revenues amounted 4.5 billion MKD.  
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The road fund transfers are in accordance with 5 criteria: number of vehicles, fuel 
consumption, road network size, population and LSG area.  
Another source of earmarked equalization is the Agency for Underdeveloped 
Regions. These financial assets should be earmarked with accepted by the Agency 
investment and similar programs but the practice is heavily politically driven. 
The breakdown of own source revenues is illustrated in the next graph.  
 
 
Structure of own-source revenues (2000)
18%
66%
2%
14%
Property tax Property transactions tax Inheritance tax Communal fees
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the new law on financing, the law on budget was defining the local 
finances and the budget process. With the law on limiting public consumption the cap 
system was defined for Macedonian LSG. The assessed and collected own tax revenues 
and fees are transferred into the treasury system of Macedonia. These revenues are 
distributed once again to the LSG in accordance with the formula: 80 % criteria 
population, 10 % criteria the LSG area and 10 % the number of settlements. The special 
status of the city of Skopje requires the city to receive around 38.5 % and the consisting 
LSG within Skopje the remained 61.5 %. The revenues above the cap are distributed in 
the second half of the year as general grants in accordance with government decisions.  
The next figure shows the own tax collection distribution. Twenty out of 30 local 
units of the PRO are collecting less then the average collection. The uneven distribution 
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is due to low incentives for collection, the cap system deficiencies and because the LSG 
do not have the authority to collect their own revenues. That is why the pilot project for 
four LSG to collect their revenues was launched last year and it proved success so far.  
 
Frequency distribution
(percent of average own tax collection in 2000)
8
7
3
2 2 2
6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
<20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100% 101-120% >120%
 
 
 
 
 
 
The new law on financing LSG is identifying the following sources of financing: 
Own source revenues: 
1. Own sources of revenues   
a. Local taxes (property tax, transfer of property tax, inheritance tax and gift 
tax) 
b. Local fees (communal fees, administrative fees)  
c. Local charges (construction land charges, communal activity charges, 
spatial planning charges) 
d. Revenues from property (rents, interests, capital revenues from property 
sale) 
e. Donations 
f. Fines 
g. Self contributions  
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2. Donations (a contract between the donator and the mayor after approval from the 
LSG council)  
3. Self contributions (LSG council decision defines all related variables) 
Sharing type revenues: 
4. Personal income tax revenues (sharing tax distributed in at least 12 transfers.) 
a. 3 % from the PIT of the salaries collected from the LSG on which territory 
the employee lives. The 2002 census can help a lot in identifying these 
data, since in Macedonia the employer is responsible for paying the PIT on 
behalf of the employee. (Around 250 million MKD per year) 
b. 100 % PIT collected from artisan activities. (Around 5 million MKD per 
year). 
Transfers from the central government: 
5. VAT revenues (3 % from the total collection in the last year before the new fiscal 
year. Equalization fund with criteria for redistribution in dependence of at least 50 
% from the population in the LSG and 50 % dependence on other criteria 
stipulated by the methodology defined by the government. The proposal for the 
methodology is on the minister of finance in agreement with the commission for 
monitoring of the development of the financing system. The proposal deadline is 
30th of June in the current year for the next fiscal year. The methodology will have 
separate provisions for the city of Skopje. Around 700 million MKD).  
6. Earmarked transfers-categorical grants (depending on projects and programs. The 
appropriate funds and ministries are monitoring the earmarked funds usage. Any 
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notified irregularities would trigger the funds and the ministries to stop the 
execution of transfers).  
7. Capital transfers. (In accordance with programs specified by the government. The 
appropriate funds and ministries are monitoring the earmarked funds usage. Any 
notified irregularities would trigger the funds and the ministries to stop the 
execution of transfers). 
8. Block transfers. (In accordance with article 22 paragraphs 5, 7, 8 and 9 from the 
law on LSG. The appropriate funds and ministries are responsible for defining 
methodology and criteria based on formula for transfer. Distributed in at least 12 
transfers. There is no specific date stipulated when the methodology could be 
available). 
9. Delegated competency. The mayor and the appropriate ministry responsible for 
the competency are signing contract. 
The following table illustrates the revenue sources with the new law for the LSG.  
 
Total budget 
revenues around 
2.6 billion MKD 
Block transfers 
10.530 billion MKD 
(as per 2003 central budget) 
Transfers with the new law 
955 million MKD 
         
Total 
revenues 
administ
rative 
budget 
2001 
Total 
other 
funds 
2001 
Educatio
n Health 
Social 
protection Culture 
3% 
transfers 
from 
PIT 
(2003 
base) 
100 % 
transfers 
from 
PIT on 
artisans 
3 % 
VAT 
transfer 
(2003 
base) 
1,000 
million  
1,600 
million 9 billion 
30 
million 
1 billion 
MKD 
500 
million 
250 
million 
5 
million 
700 
million 
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Measuring fiscal capacity  
Fiscal capacity can be defined as ability of the LSG to raise revenues from its own 
sources in order to be able to cover standardized set of public goods and services. It is a 
challenge to measure the fiscal capacity of the Macedonian LSG.  
Here we will present three measurements of fiscal capacity for Macedonia and 
illustrate in the table bellow their comparison.  
 
 PROS CONS 
Revenue collection 
1. Data readily 
available (at least 
for 30 LSG in 
accordance with the 
PRO organization) 
2. Easily to understand 
and transparent 
3. Easy manipulation 
with the data 
1. Different level of 
enforcement 
2. Different level of 
compliance 
3. Different tax rates 
4. Low level of 
incentives 
Gross Domestic Product  
1. Total value of goods 
and services 
produced in the LSG 
 
1. Data availability 
(last time 1995 
Gross Social 
Product from the 
State Statistical 
Office; this year for 
the first time GDP 
for 1998 and 2002 
UNDP project) 
Representative Tax System   
with regression analyses 
1. When insufficient 
data are available 
for conventional 
RTS system 
1. Fiscal data 
requirements 
2. Less transparent and 
difficult to 
understand 
Total Taxable Resources 
(not used in this paper) 
1. Improves the GDP 
based approach 
1. Data requirements 
2. Complex data 
manipulation 
 
1. Revenue collection 
For the purpose of estimating the fiscal capacity we can use the own tax revenues 
(property tax, transfer of property, gift and inheritance tax and communal tax) and their 
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actual collection or their assessment. The advantage is that we can get readily and timely 
data from the PRO (at least for the 30 LSG). The disadvantage is the reduced incentives 
for LSG to collect the revenues. Other disadvantage is the variability of enforcement and 
compliance within different local units of PRO. At the moment one disadvantage of the 
property tax system is the self-assessment and lack of audit. 
The methodology usually requires adjusting the actual revenue collection with the 
population and the price levels among LSG. Since Macedonia is a small country, the 
price level is similar across LSG and we will only use the per capita revenue collection. 
 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Data for GDP are available for 1998 and 2002 based on the UNDP project on 
improving statistical information system for the LSG. It is a good measure because it is 
irrespective of the residence of the worker and/or the company.   
 3. Representative tax system with regression analyses 
With this technique we will estimate the effect of the size of LSG tax base on 
revenue collections by using the OLS regression technique. We will use the total own 
revenue collection among the 30 PRO local units as dependent variable. The independent 
variable will be the GDP per capita for 2002. The algebraic representation of the OLS 
estimation is: 
εβα +⋅+= GMPcollectionvenueRe  
the term ε  can be interpreted as the result of the different levels of fiscal effort among 
the LSG.  
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The results from the estimation are presented in the next table5: 
Dependent Variable: REV 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/14/04   Time: 19:34 
Sample: 1 30 
Included observations: 30 
REV=C(1)+C(2)*GMP 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 141.8806 73.38554 1.933359 0.0634 
C(2) 0.000531 0.000205 2.587962 0.0151 
R-squared 0.193027     Mean dependent var 313.8667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164206     S.D. dependent var 186.4987 
S.E. of regression 170.5004     Akaike info criterion 13.17969 
Sum squared resid 813971.1     Schwarz criterion 13.27311 
Log likelihood -195.6954     Durbin-Watson stat 1.925028 
 
The coefficient of determination is very low. The estimated parameter however is 
statistically significant. The fiscal capacity will be defined as the proxies from the 
prediction of the above equation on the basis of the tax base (GDP).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 E-Views software package estimation.  
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Alternative measures for the fiscal capacity of the Macedonian LSG 
(PRO Nomenclature of organization) 
(Ranking: 1 is the lowest performance and 30 is the best performance) 
 
 
Own Revenue collection 
per capita 
(available for 30 PRO 
units) 
 
 
GMP per capita PPP based 
(available for 123 LSG 
2002) 
 
Representative tax system 
with regression analysis 
LSG 
Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank 
Kicevo 239 12 172,562 1 233 1 
Gostivar 303 20 184,745 2 240 2 
TETOVO 388 25 190,836 3 243 3 
Debar 251 15 195,761 4 246 4 
K.Palanka 251 14 207,101 5 252 5 
Probistip 225 10 213,257 6 255 6 
Struga 436 26 219,283 7 258 7 
Kumanovo 324 23 219,413 8 258 8 
Valandovo 280 18 222,134 9 260 9 
Kocani 199 8 248,638 10 274 10 
Kratovo 173 4 251,683 11 275 11 
Delcevo 186 7 253,044 12 276 12 
M.Brod 162 3 267,041 13 284 13 
Vinica 173 5 271,382 14 286 14 
Krusevo 161 2 305,662 15 304 15 
Kavadarci 352 24 318,816 16 311 16 
Berovo 235 11 324,000 17 314 17 
PRILEP 158 1 330,156 18 317 18 
Ohrid 1,015 30 333,655 19 319 19 
Negotino 253 16 342,662 20 324 20 
Resen 495 27 343,505 21 324 21 
Veles 219 9 352,318 22 329 22 
STRUMICA 321 22 362,426 23 334 23 
STIP 317 21 377,914 24 342 24 
Gevgelija 249 13 415,174 25 362 25 
Radovis 264 17 435,197 26 373 26 
BITOLA 561 28 448,092 27 380 27 
D.Hisar 185 6 457,423 28 385 28 
Sv.Nikole 285 19 461,052 29 387 29 
SKOPJE 01 756 29 999,151 30 672 30 
       
Min  158  172,562  233  
Max 1,015  999,151  672  
Average 314  324,136  314  
Coefficient of 
variation 59  48  26  
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The correlation coefficients for the alternative measures of fiscal capacity for the 
Macedonian LSG are presented in the next table.  
Correlation
RA GMP RTS 
RA 1     
GMP 0.44 1  
RTS 0.44 1.00 1
 
We can conclude relative consistency with one another of the three measures of 
fiscal capacity. The correlation for the RTS and the GMP is understandable because it is a 
regression of these two variables and the predicted scores we are using.  
Recommendation is strong statistical unit within the state statistical office and 
separate departments for LSG within the ministry of finance and the ministry of LSG in 
order to achieve quality in the statistical information system.  
At the moment we can benefit the favorable circumstance for fiscal capacity 
estimation by using TTR system because the GDP PPP data are available for 2002 and 
the census data are for 2002. But this is separate complex research that requires additional 
precise and exact data (the problem of origin based and HQ based businesses and 
personal income tax payment and all the subsidies and transfers adjustment for social and 
pension and other contributions) but it is achievable. On the other side the RTS with the 
regression analyses is less transparent and understandable for policy makers.  
Thus, Macedonia can in the beginning start with the RA system adjusted for the 
information from the pilot projects and to build capacity in the state statistical office for 
regular GDP calculation per LSG and other necessarily data for the TTR system to be in 
use. Still, it is up to the government to set up clear objectives on what they want to 
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achieve because the different measure of fiscal capacity can give different ranks for the 
LSG relative one on another. Consider the LSG Demir Hisar from above table. Demir 
Hisar ranks very good as per GDP (28 rank) but experience very bad ranking as per 
revenue collection (only 6). The situation is ambiguous and it comes from the natural 
resources this LSG has in forestry and that influence a high GDP per capita but low tax 
base for revenue collection and that is why it ranks very bad. Maybe a solution could be 
for the concessions on natural resources to be transferred to the LSG and/or maybe to use 
a variable on natural resources in the equalization formula. It is arguable but it depends 
on what the government wants to achieve.  
Interesting enough is the program that started this year on pilot project for 
devolving the administration of property tax to LSG for 2005 taxation. The four pilot 
projects comprise the LSG: Veles, Gostivar, Sveti Nikole and Struga (four LSG from the 
before 1996 organization but 19 LSG from the 123 LSG). The last information about the 
improvement of efficiency in the collection is illustrated in the next table6: 
Increase of the collection by taxes for the period Jan-Sep 2004 after devolution of 
administration  
Property tax Transfer of property tax 
Inheritance and 
gift tax 
 
Communal tax 
 
 
41.9 % 
 
195 % 106.4 % 16.6 % 
Forecast of the collection for the end of the 2004 (CEA forecast) 
56 % 260 % 142 % 
 
 
22 % 
 
 
                                                 
6  I would like to thank Mr. Ace Kocevski, the mayor of Veles, for the data provided.  
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Equalization issues 
 
With the new law the unconditional equalization fund (from the VAT transfers) 
will depend at least 50 % from the population. The formula will be defined within the 
ministry of finance and approved by the commission responsible for the monitoring of the 
development of the financing system. With the new law the cap system will be abolished 
as a source for equalization and it is my opinion that the agency for underdeveloped 
regions should be abolished and transformed into capital investment agency that will deal 
with the capital grants.  
In the next table and figure we are estimating and simulating the unconditional 
equalization transfers to the LSG as if it depends 100 % from the population. Also, we 
are using the data on increased revenue collection from the pilot project’s LSG and map 
the appropriate increase to all LSG.     
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MUNICIPAL UNCONDITIONAL EQUALIZATION FUND
From central budget 2002 data
3 % from the VAT collection from the last year: 700,000 in 000 MKD
Population 
Number of persons
100 % population based Original Grant calculator-VAT Own Revenue
Additional own 
after 
administration 
devolution
Total Own Revenue
Additional own 
after 
administration 
devolution
After 
equalization and 
devolution
1 Bitola 105,644 36,563 59,399 69,940 165,902 562 662 1,570
2 Resen 16,825 5,823 8,356 6,012 20,191 497 357 1,200
3 D.Hisar 9,497 3,287 1,782 1,029 6,098 188 108 642
4 Ohrid 61,256 21,201 62,403 77,117 160,720 1,019 1,259 2,624
5 Struga 65,809 22,776 27,653 27,575 78,004 420 419 1,185
6 Prilep 94,358 32,657 15,016 15,243 62,916 159 162 667
7 Veles 66,541 23,030 14,612 14,140 51,782 220 213 778
8 Kavadarci 42,882 14,841 15,152 14,907 44,900 353 348 1,047
9 Krusevo 11,812 4,088 1,906 1,162 7,156 161 98 606
10 M.Brod 11,686 4,045 1,943 1,252 7,239 166 107 619
11 Negotino 23,757 8,222 5,980 7,128 21,330 252 300 898
12 Strumica 92,625 32,057 28,832 31,417 92,306 311 339 997
13 Berovo 19,458 6,734 4,579 4,023 15,336 235 207 788
14 Valandovo 11,890 4,115 3,343 3,433 10,892 281 289 916
15 Gevgelija 35,121 12,155 8,791 6,196 27,142 250 176 773
16 Radovis 31,780 10,999 8,398 6,312 25,709 264 199 809
17 Tetovo 189,066 65,435 75,542 99,831 240,808 400 528 1,274
18 Gostivar 116,864 40,446 37,264 42,349 120,060 319 362 1,027
19 Debar 24,251 8,393 6,147 7,707 22,247 253 318 917
20 Kicevo 56,739 19,637 13,898 12,669 46,204 245 223 814
21 Stip 51,808 17,931 16,461 19,174 53,565 318 370 1,034
22 Vinica 19,938 6,901 3,462 2,673 13,036 174 134 654
23 Delcevo 25,615 8,865 4,788 4,182 17,836 187 163 696
24 Kocani 48,846 16,906 9,761 9,625 36,292 200 197 743
25 Kratovo 10,441 3,614 1,812 1,093 6,519 174 105 624
26 K.Palanka 24,964 8,640 6,299 6,634 21,573 252 266 864
27 Kumanovo 137,382 47,548 45,213 59,303 152,063 329 432 1,107
28 Probistip 16,193 5,604 3,657 2,412 11,673 226 149 721
29 Sv.Nikole 21,355 7,391 6,094 4,471 17,956 285 209 841
30 Skopje 578,144 200,095 438,455 565,777 1,204,327 758 979 2,083
2,022,547 700,000 936,998 1,124,787 2,761,785 463 556 1,365
Standard variation                 187 256 440
Coefficient of variation 40.3% 46.1% 32.2%
Revenue current and forecast with devolution Revenue per capita
in 1,000 denars
 
 
 
Municipal revenue per capita
own revenue distribution and distribution 
after allocating the unconcinditional grant
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We can see from the coefficient of variation that the formula is successful in 
equalizing. However there are three outliers: City of Skopje, Ohrid and Bitola. Additional 
improvements can be made in the formula but this will require additional research. One 
step could be to exclude the outliers by taking zero population for those LSG.  
Administration and organization 
For the LSG administration the new law on financing the LSG will have the 
following mandatory requirements: 
1. At least two financial officers responsible for financial management, budget 
preparation and execution and accounting. 
2. Need for chief accountant (assigned by the mayor and with economic faculty and 
5 years experience in finances).  
3. Procedures and system for internal audit. (Internal auditors assigned by the LSG 
council on proposal from the Mayor). The internal auditor should have economic 
or faculty of law and two year experience in finances. The auditor is independent 
and responsible in front of the mayor and the LSG council (we would like to 
mention that the auditor is responsible in front of the laws and regulations and that 
his/her independence is guarantied only with transparent mechanisms and 
instruments and not by declaring in the law. Internal audit can be conducted by 
other LSG in accordance with a contract. The state audit agency is also 
responsible for the audit of the LSG.  
4. At least three employees responsible for tax assessment and collection. The Public 
Revenue Office (PRO) is organized in 6 regional centers with total of 30 local 
units. The information system is such that it is difficult to get data disaggregated 
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to all LSG. We hope that when the tax administration became a LSG 
administration the need for statistics on local level will be more appreciated. The 
employees of the ministry of finance and the PRO are deconcentrated in the 30 
local units (financial and accounting department) and will became LSG 
employees as well as the premises, buildings and archives will be transferred to 
LSG. The LSG can sign contracts among themselves for administering own 
revenues.  
The next figure illustrates the mandatory employment requirements stipulated with 
the new law on financing LSG.  
1. Commission for the overall monitoring of the system
2. Commission responsible for the first phase conditions
3. Commission responsible for the second phase conditions
LSG
Mandatory requirements with the new law on financing LSG
Budget
Accounting
Financial management
at least two financial officers
and chief accountant
State
Audit Internal
Office audit
at least one employee
Tax
at least three employees
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Statistical information system 
The process of decentralization is complex and requires a lot of coordination and 
engagement of each sector of the government. For one to manage the process one will 
require data and information. In this part we will list institutions that can provide data and 
information related to the process of decentralization (at least for those we were using for 
our research): 
1. State Statistical Office (SSO). This institution has conducted the 
census in 2002. Data are available on the 1994 census as well. The 
SSO was calculating up to 1995 the gross social product by 
municipality but with the new law on territorial division from 1996 
they stopped the practice. The level of desegregation was following 
the NUTS 4 organization of the before 1996 territorial organization. 
Recommendation is for the SSO to continue the calculation of GDP 
per LSG. Another recommendation is for the SSO to organize 
separate department for LSG in their organization.  
2. Many other government institutions are capable of providing data 
on NUTS 4 level (all ministries and PRO).   
3. Financial statements per LSG on NUTS 5 (123 LSG) are available 
from the ministry of finance starting 2000 until 2003. 
Recommendation for the government is to organize a separate 
department within the ministry of finance that will deal with LSG 
issues.  
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Conclusion 
1. The process of decentralization was backed up by two important documents. First, 
the government program from 1999 and second, the strategy for reforming the 
public administration from May 1999. As a result the working team within the 
Ministry of LSG was established in March 1999. Macedonia signed the European 
charter in 1997. The process was on right track up to the 2001 crises and now is 
under additional pressure and risk after the Ohrid framework agreement was set 
up in 2001.  
2. The process of decentralization in Macedonia started first with the revenue 
assignment of the LSG and the expenditure assignments were loosely assumed. 
No information on the LSG boundaries was available up to the last moment for 
parliament procedure. There were no analyses done on the efficiency of the newly 
enacted boundaries since it was heavily political driven process. There were no 
discussions on the administrative capacity and the fiscal capacity of the LSG. The 
proposed by the law territorial organization is challenged by the referendum that 
should happen in the early November 2004. The question of the referendum is 
whether we like the territorial organization from 1996 with 123 LSG or the new 
law on territorial organization with the proposed 84 LSG.  The best description of 
the opponent’s attitude about the new territorial organization is described by the 
Helsinki committee for human rights in Macedonia public announcement7:  
“The new law on territorial organization is (in its contents and the 
procedure for its enactment): 
                                                 
7 All these statements are based on analyses of the law, which you can find in a compressed version at: 
www.helkom.org.mk.   
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? Against the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 
? Is overruling the law 
? Internally inconsistent 
? Against the Ohrid framework agreement. 
3. The process of decentralization is now on wrong track. It is wrong to assume the 
process of decentralization as only a tool for success of the Ohrid agreement. 
These problems occurred because of lack of risk assessment during this early 
stage of the decentralization process from the government. Also, it was mistake to 
connect the process of decentralization with the Ohrid framework agreement since 
the will and the process actually started in 1999 and now it is additionally 
complicated with the ethnic dimension. The government failed to sell the process 
to the citizens.  
4. The territorial organization from 1996 shows increasing economies of scale for 
LSG up to 6000 inhabitants. With the census from 2002 and the territorial 
organization from 1996 there are 52 municipalities (150,000 population) with less 
then 6000 inhabitants out of 123.   
5. The expenditure assignments in Macedonia will be conducted in a two stage 
process monitored by a government commission.  
6. Macedonia is highly centralized country and high vertical imbalance with LSG 
expenditure of 1.7 % from the GDP compared with the central government 
expenditure of 21.27 % from GDP. With the new law the LSG will have 
expenditures in amount of 2.1 % from the GDP (from the PIT sharing and VAT 
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unconditional grant) and in amount of 6.1 % from the GDP with the block grants 
included. 
7. There is biased variability toward higher expenditures in the big urban centers and 
88 LSG (72 % from 123) are realizing less than 40 % of the average expenditures 
from the total. This could be a good argument for a two tier LSG system for the 
purpose of more balanced regional development. But, this could be politically 
unacceptable.  
8. At the moment there are two equalization schemes. First is the cap system, which 
proved inefficient with no incentives for the LSG to comply (20 out of 30 LSG –
NUTS 4 organization, are collecting less than the average collection from the 
total). The second is through the Agency for underdeveloped regions, which is 
highly politically influenced in their transfer decision process. With the new law 
there will be only one equalization scheme with the unconditional grant from the 
VAT. We suggest for the agency for underdeveloped regions to become agency 
for capital investment.  
9. Three techniques for measuring fiscal capacity are introduced. At the moment it 
seams reasonable to use the revenue collection approach (easily to understand and 
to get data) internalizing the experiences from the pilot projects for devolving the 
administration of property tax. In longer term the total taxable resources could be 
used since the state statistical office is capable of estimating the GDP by LSG and 
it can provide the other required data as well.  
10. We recommend for the horizontal equalization scheme a 100 % use of number of 
population, for the first year, since it is simple and is equalizing (lower coefficient 
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of variation). Within one year the government should conduct additional research 
and simulations.  
11. What needs to be additionally done is to investigate and produce the efficiency of 
the organizational structure of the municipalities, job descriptions, procedures, 
supervision, tax administration, citizen participation and information at the 
moment and the assessment of the training and financial needs for the status after 
the assignment of expenditure responsibilities during each stage of the 
decentralization.  
12. We also recommend more focus on the statistical information system. The state 
statistical office is ready to assume some responsibility from capacity point of 
view. There is a need for new systematization in the ministry of finance and the 
need for LSG department is more than a needed. Only two persons working 
within the budget department (responsible for LSG) when the process is in the 
very beginning and with high priority is unacceptable and not serious. 
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